

THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY BULLETIN

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A bust of Bertrand Russell, with Erasmus portrayed in the background painting.

The June 2023 Annual Meeting in Iowa City!

BY LANDON D. C. ELKIND

1 Our 50th annual meeting

The Bertrand Russell Society 2023 and 50th Annual Meeting will be held in-person on June 17-18 at the University of Iowa in Iowa City, Iowa. It will be a hybrid meeting that also includes online-only participants and presentations by Zoom. We enjoyed excellent results from the hybrid format at the 49th annual meeting. Accordingly, we are excited for our second hybrid meeting as we broaden and enrich our community of scholars and activists.

2 Schedule information

The conference talks will begin on Saturday, June 17. Talks will be held also on the morning of Sunday, June 18. The Board meeting and Membership meeting will occur on those days well.

3 Conference Venue

The Iowa House Hotel has some rooms blocked off for annual meeting attendees. Rooms are \$106 and include parking and wireless internet.

To book a room, visit <https://iowahousehotel.uiowa.edu/>. Use the group code 3022.

4 Accommodations

Reservations (off-campus or on-campus) will need to be made independently of the BRS, but attendees are welcome to reserve one of the blocked off rooms in the Iowa House Hotel, which is an accessible location alongside the Iowa River and the place where all meeting events will occur.

5 Travel information

Travel information will be posted on the Bertrand Russell Society. Such information is also available from the University of Iowa website. If you are flying, there are airports in driving distance in Cedar Rapids (about 30 minutes), Des Moines (about 2 hours), and Chicago (about 3.5-4 hours).

6 Registration information

All attendees, whether in-person or online-only, should register by Monday, May 1st, 2023 at this link: <https://bertrandrussellsociety.org/annual-meeting-registration/>.

Registration is FREE for all persons, whether in-person or online-only. Online-only attendees must register to get the Zoom link. Please use the same link as above.

An optional suggested donation of \$20 will help us cover conference expenses (refreshments, Zoom hosting, etc.). You can make a donation at the registration page using the above link.

7 Speaker information

A call for paper abstracts will be posted on our website.

Speakers and abstracts will be posted here: <https://bertrandrussellsociety.org/papers/>.

8 Zoom Software

Online-only participants will need to download Zoom, a free online video conferencing software that is easy to use and readily allows for dozens of simultaneous connections. Presenters must be BRS members (attendees do not need to be BRS members)

Please also note that you must be a member of the Bertrand Russell Society to present at the annual meeting. This applies to online and in-person speakers. Attendees who are not giving a talk can still attend without being a BRS member. You can check your membership status here: <https://russell.humanities.mcmaster.ca/brsmembers.htm>.

You may join (or renew membership in) the BRS, and see the many benefits of membership, at this link: <https://bertrandrussellsociety.org/join/>.


9 Questions?

You may contact us at <https://bertrandrussellsociety.org/contact/>.

Richmond Park

BY SHEILA TURCON

An interesting map arrived at the Russell Archives in the third accrual of Edith Russell's papers. The map was first published in 1949 and reprinted with corrections in 1951. Russell grew up in Pembroke Lodge, which has its own grounds, in Richmond Park. He wrote about it in his *Autobiography*.¹



Ordnance Survey. Royal Parks (Richmond Park). Edith Russell's explanatory note appears on the map cover.

Transcription of the key written by Edith follows. Places are given numbers, trees are given letters.

- | | |
|--|---|
| 1 the Mound | 18 thorny knowe [sic] |
| 2 Stables | 19 Lucas's Pond |
| 3 Singletons–Gate House–Beer & Apples | 20 Lucas's |
| 4 Bowling Green. Box hedge. Holly hedge | 21 the Plantation–Duke of Cambridge's (the Forrester's) Pheasant preserve |
| 5 Summer House by Bowling Green | 22 the Vulgar House |
| 6 Tree of the Four Little Children that Went Round the World (Ilex in front of it) | 23 the boat house |
| 7 Underground House | 24 the loud trombone |
| 8 Swing Tree | 25 Cad's walk–Cattermole & Young Lady |
| 9 Fountain | 26 Sawyer's (Eddie Marsh's Aunt) |
| 10 Pigeon House (against house) | 27 Professor Owen's House |
| 11 Arbour, pergola | 28 Sir Francis Burdett's House |
| 12 East and West walks | 29 Lady Bowater's House |
| 13 Hyacinth Home | 30 Sir Francis Cook's House |
| 14 South Summer House | B Our wood |
| 15 Skittles | C Van Gogh tree |
| 16 Wood Summer House | D Our Beech tree |
| 17 Windsor Summer House | E the Well Educated Tree |
| A Our beech | F Alph |

Explanatory information:²

Numbers 1 to 17 and letter A are in the grounds of Pembroke Lodge. Number 1, “the Mound”, is placed beside the King Henry VIII Mound. The remaining numbers are mainly for outbuildings. Places for playing games, bowling and skittles, are marked. Number 3 refers to the lodge-keeper and his family. Russell wrote about them in his *Autobiography*. The beer and apples were “strictly forbidden” (*Auto* 27). Number 6, “Tree of the Four Little Children that Went Round the World” does not describe the tree, although the ilex (holly) shrub in front of it is mentioned. Instead it refer-

ences a story by Edward Lear contained in his book *Nonsense Songs, Stories, Botany, and Alphabets* (London: Robert John Bush, 1871). The book is in Russell's library with an inscription: “John Frank Stanley Russell from his loving grandmother H.M. Stanley of Alderley, Christmas 1870.” Frank was a nickname for “Francis”, Russell's brother. In his *Autobiography* Russell wrote about number 7, the “Underground House”, which he dug out with a friend in order to lure a housemaid inside to kiss her (*Auto* 39). The childhood friend was Jimmie Baillie. On 15 June 1952 Russell wrote to Baillie: “I am sorry to say that the underground house

we made has been carefully built up.” Number 8, “Swing Tree”; Russell does describe a beech tree where he “would hang upside down and scream” (*Auto* 37). This may be the swing tree or it may be A, “Our beech.” A “View from the West Walk” was painted by Samuel Helstead in 1896 (number 12). A water-colour “Wild Hyacinths. Pembroke Lodge” was painted by Fred Dixey in 1899 (number 13).

The wishing tree mentioned in my article was an oak tree; it is not marked. Instead a beech tree, letter A, is noted. Russell did not mention the wishing tree in his *Autobiography* but it appeared in Lady John Russell’s memoirs. Daniel Hearsom pointed it out to me during my 2012 visit.

Number 18, “thorny knowe” [sic] is placed beside the Hornbeam Walk at Round Seat. Knowe is a Scottish variant of knoll.

Number 19, “Lucas’s Pond” is placed beside White Ash Pond and Number 20 is beside Whiteash Lodge. I could not find any history of this property. White Ash Lodge was offered to let by Savills in 2022. It should not be confused with White Lodge, a different property in the park. Lucas may have been a friend of Russell’s.

Number 21, “the Plantation–Duke of Cambridge’s (the Forrester’s) Pheasant preserve” refers to Prince George, Duke of Cambridge (1819–1904), the ranger of Richmond Park from 1857. The nearest landmark to the preserve is Oak Lodge.

Number 22, “the Vulgar House” is placed beside Mount Clare house. The house was purchased by Sir John Dick (1719–1804) in 1780.

Number 23, “the boat house” is placed beside the Pen Ponds.

Number 24, “the loud trombone” is placed adjacent to Kidney Wood. An image of Kidney Wood can be found online. What Russell is referring to is unknown.

Number 25, “Cad’s Walk–Cattermole & Young Lady” is marked beside a foot path where the “Reservoir (covered)” is located. Russell wrote in his *Autobiography*: “There was a young man called Cattermole who, I suppose, must have been a bit of a bounder; but I watched him

walking with a smart young woman with easy familiarity and evidently pleasing her” (*Auto* 41).

Number 26, “Sawyer’s (Eddie Marsh’s Aunt)” is placed beside Bog Lodge. Bog Lodge was initially called Cooper’s Lodge when it was built in 1735, then Lucas’s Lodge, and finally became Holly Lodge in 1993. When I visited Pembroke Lodge in 2012, the gala held that evening was in support of the Holly Lodge Centre whose patron is Princess Alexandra. She was in attendance that evening. Russell was friends with Sir Edward Marsh (1872–1953) at Trinity College, Cambridge. This is an indication they may have met before Cambridge.

Number 27, “Professor Owen’s House” is placed beside East Sheen Gate. Sir Richard Owen (1804–1892) lived at Sheen Cottage until his death. He served as Fullerian Professor of Physiology at the Royal Institution from 1858 to 1862. His home was destroyed by bombs in 1944.

Number 28, “Sir Francis Burdett’s House” was placed beside Richmond Gate. Sir Francis Burdett, 7th Baronet (1813–1892) was the father of Russell’s friend Maud (1872–1951).

Number 29, “Lady Bowater’s House” was placed beside Thatched House Lodge. General Sir Edward Bowater (1787–1861) lived there until his death. Lady Bowater must be his widow. Thatched House Lodge is in 2022 the home of Princess Alexandra.

Number 30, “Sir Francis Cook’s House” was placed on the edge of the map. Sir Francis Cook, 1st Baronet (1817–1901) lived in Doughty House which takes its name from its first owner, Elizabeth Doughty. Cook bought the property in 1849.

Letter B, “Our Wood” was placed in the Saw Pit Plantation which was planted c1873. The remaining letters concern trees. The trees are located near to each other, east of the Bishop’s Gate Lodge and south of the Richmond Cemetery on Lower Grove Road. The lodge took its name from an assistant keeper. D has the same name as A. Why some of the trees are named as they are is not known. Vincent Van Gogh

(1853–1890) is well-known for painting trees. However, the first painting of a tree that survives is 1883. None of his trees were painted in England. Van Gogh did spend time in London beginning in 1873. On 25 November 1876 he wrote to his brother Theo about “gnarled elm trees” that he encountered on his way to Petersham.

These places of importance to Russell were recorded between 1952 and 1955 when he lived nearby, in Queen’s Road. The initials “ER” are used; he and Edith married in 1952. The map complements the early chapters of his *Autobiography*, although some designations remain a mystery. Returning to the area more than a half-century later, it is evident he still had clear memories of this beloved place and felt it worth his time to record them.

Many historical images of Pembroke Lodge appear in my article as well as those taken in 2012. A photograph I took out in the Park of the Pen Ponds in 1984 also appears. I returned in 2013 to walk in the park after visiting Petersham Nurseries. An image from that visit also appears below.

Notes

¹Bertrand Russell, *The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell, 1872-1914*, Vol. 1: London, Allen and Unwin, 1967. See also my article on Pembroke Lodge, <https://russell-homes.mcmaster.ca/home/pembroke-lodge>.

²In compiling this information, the author has made some use of Max Lankester’s *What’s in a Name? Features of Richmond Park* (2015), with photographs. See also the Richmond Park Wikipedia article, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Richmond_Park#Buildings.



Richmond Park near Petersham

Russellians in Conversation

BY JAMES CONNELLY AND GREGORY LANDINI

L: Showing, Showing, Showing. I hold that Wittgenstein intuited his Doctrine of Showing as early as 1913. The Picture Theory came later and is but one of many techniques he used to try to implement Showing, including his *ab*-Notation, exclusive quantifiers to eliminate a relation of ‘identity’ and N-notation. In 1919, Wittgenstein asserts in a letter to Russell that the “main point” of his *Logish-philosophische Abhandlung* (which became his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*) lies in the demarcation between “what can be expressed by propositions” and “what cannot be expressed by propositions, but only shown.” I think Showing permeates all his work. But this raises a problem. It would seem that Showing makes influence (in either direction) wholly impossible. In the early days, Russell admitted he didn’t understand Wittgenstein (especially in connection with his remarks concerning scientific method in philosophy and its epistemology). When finally he caught on to the depth that Showing was playing in Wittgenstein’s work, Russell regarded it as an untoward mysticism concerning logical form. It threatens to replace Russell’s Scientific Method in Philosophy with a method of oracular pronouncements of showing (ellucidating) logical form coupled with an obstinate philosophical *silence* when asked for arguments for metaphysical positions. As Russell later described Wittgenstein’s view, it is,

... the basis of a curious kind of logical mysticism. He maintained that the form which a true proposition shares with the corresponding fact can only be shown, not said, since it is not another word in the language but an arrangement of words or corresponding things: “Propositions can represent the whole reality, but they cannot represent what they must have in common with reality in order to be able to represent

it- the logical form” (*My Philosophical Development* 1957, p. 114).

The question before us is whether there can be any influence in either direction between these figures if Showing permeates Wittgenstein’s work.

C: First let’s agree that by “influence” we don’t mean to speak of shared interest in what are to be the central issues and topics of philosophy. Russell influenced Wittgenstein there-- obviously. But in my view, over and above this there is substantive philosophical influence, in both directions. Wittgenstein influenced Russell, for instance, by convincing him that his multiple-relation theory of judgement (mrtj) was flawed, leaving a significant gap in Russell’s epistemology. While it is true that Russell initially claimed not to understand Wittgenstein’s objection, due to its being expressed inarticulately at their tense meeting on May 26th, 1913, there is no reason to think he did not understand it subsequently, once Wittgenstein expressed it precisely in a mid-June 1913 letter to Russell a few weeks later:

June 1913: ... I can now express my objection to your theory of judgement exactly; I believe it is obvious that, from the proposition “A judges that (say) *a* is in a relation *R* to *b*,” if correctly analysed, the proposition “ $aRb \vee \sim aRb$ ” must follow directly without the use of any further premise. This condition is not fulfilled by your theory.

Moreover, Wittgenstein was clearly influenced by Russell’s positive doctrines (by way of both confluence and critical reaction) as well as by his methods of logical analysis. Like Russell’s mrtj, for instance, Wittgenstein’s picture theory involves the idea that truth consists of a definable relation of correspondence between truth-bearers and truth-makers. While

the truth-bearers are in each case different (beliefs in Russell's case and propositions in Wittgenstein's), both men adhered to correspondence theories of truth. Of course, Wittgenstein ultimately concludes that the nature of the correspondence may only show itself, rather than literally be described, but this is a view that Wittgenstein arrives at only after substantive influence in question has already taken place.

L: I quite agree that influence must go beyond shared interests in the central issues and topics of philosophy. We are speaking of substantive philosophical influence (in either direction). And I don't mean to simply be railing at the "one time pupil becoming teacher" motif that was taken up by popular biographies discussing their relationship (e.g., in Clark's bio of Russell and expanded greatly in Monk's). I'm concerned that there can be no philosophical influence in either direction precisely because Wittgenstein's views were deeply committed to Showing.

Note that if Wittgenstein was articulating Showing in the May 26 letter, then there is every reason to believe that Russell still didn't understand the "objection" even though Wittgenstein says he can now put the objection "more exactly" and that is because Wittgenstein himself tells Russell in a letter as late as 1919 that he still has not caught on to his view that Showing is his central thesis! I see no reason to think Russell could have been convinced by Showing for we know that he regarded it as an unacceptable mysticism. But in this matter I agree that we are at a stalemate unless I offer further evidence that Showing is a 1913 doctrine and that Wittgenstein's so-called objection to the mrtj was actually his advocacy of Showing. However, that I hold that Wittgenstein did not hold a correspondence theory of truth. He held (at least in the *Tractatus*) that truth is shown not said. And what can be shown cannot be said in a theory (*TLP* 4.1212; *Notebooks*, Nov 29, 1914). There can be no theory of number, nor any theory of logic, nor any theory of the projective relation of shared log-

ical form between truth-bearer and would-be truth-maker, for theories involve a subject matter that can be said, and there is no subject matter in these cases according to Wittgenstein - but only showing (illucidation). Thus, I say that while there are shared philosophical topics (e.g., truth, logic, mathematics, necessity, logical form), there is no shared influence at all.

C: So you hold that Wittgenstein adhered to Showing before it was recorded explicitly in his April 1914 *Notes Dictated to Moore*, perhaps even earlier, prior to his May-June 1913 critique of the mrtj developed in Russell's *Theory of Knowledge* manuscript? I do not think this is possible, since I hold that Showing emerged out of Wittgenstein's critique of the mrtj, as an attempt to make sense of how logical form can figure within propositions, without giving rise to illicit further premises of the sort proscribed in Wittgenstein's mid-June 1913 letter to Russell. According to Wittgenstein, $aRb \vee \sim aRb$ has to follow from the judgment that aRb directly, without appeal to any further premise. This proscription would apply to any significance constraint designed to preclude nonsense judgments by assigning a , R , and b to appropriate positions in the logical form of a dyadic, first-order complex.

L: Note that every tautology is logically entailed (follows) trivially from every wff whatsoever (and in some sense) is without further premise! That is $q \supset (aRb \vee \sim aRb)$ is trivial. So you must mean something else. Perhaps you mean that, the expression " $c_1 \frown c_2 \frown c_3$ " must be well-formed (and thereby have a truth condition and a falsehood condition) where " s " stands in a multiple judgment-relation severally to c_1 and to c_2 and to c_3 . Is that right? But why should Russell hold such a view at all; and more to the point, why should it be regarded as a demand of logic? That a mind does not form nonsense judgments seems to be a matter of contingent psychology and indeed the linguist Chomsky denies it citing "Colorless green ideas sleep furiously." I find this "ruling out nonsense without further premise" demand completely

unjustified—unless it is Wittgenstein’s demand that “truth” be a matter of Showing logical form and not describing (as Russell held) the structure of a would-be corresponding fact. Wittgenstein holds, as I see it, that any truth-bearer must show the would-be truth maker appropriate to it by sharing its logical form. In contrast, any definite description of a fact would have to require “further premises” saying that a universal is involved and may often also require saying things about the ordering. But “... is a universal” is a pseudo-predicate that must be shown, not said.

I hold that Showing is a 1913 intuition. One piece of evidence is that there is a nice tie between Showing and Wittgenstein’s *ab*-Notation. From the date of a letter Russell wrote to Ottoline about Wittgenstein’s upsetting visit with the Whiteheads, the archivist and philosopher Ken Blackwell has nicely found a way to date the *ab*-Notation at least to 15 March of 1913. According to Russell’s *Autobiography*, Whitehead’s perplexity over being told that a proposition as two poles *apb* unnerved Wittgenstein. Russell reported Wittgenstein’s unpleasant behavior to Ottoline. This date is well before the famous May and June comments Wittgenstein wrote to Russell demanding that the mrtj exclude nonsense “without further premiss.” And we know that Wittgenstein asserts categorically in his Aug. 1913 *Notes on Logic* that the *ab*-Notation must itself be involved in any correct theory of judgment. He wrote:

... and it seems that we shall only be able to express the proposition “A believes *p*” correctly by the *ab*-Notation...

I hold that Wittgenstein was advocating Showing as early as March and held that it is the only way to successfully form a genuinely scientific method in philosophy. The proper scientific method in philosophy is to Show (elucidate) logical form, and the implication is that while logic and mathematics are genuine sciences above (or below) others, they are not bodies of truths like the empirical sciences.

C: One straightforward way to evade the conclusion that Showing undermines influence (in either direction) is to maintain, as I do, that Showing is a 1914 doctrine. This point is independent of the question as to whether the Picture Theory (which is known to date to 1914) predates or is identical to the Doctrine of Showing. That is, I hold that the 1913 *ab*-Notation predates the doctrine of Showing. It represents Wittgenstein’s attempt to study bi-polarity in abstraction from truth-functionality. This is why Wittgenstein says in a Nov. 1913 letter to Russell that it cannot be yet decided whether *ab*-functions are identical to truth-functions. It is possible that the *ab*-Notation dates to March 1913 or earlier, but the evidence for that is not conclusive, and neither is the evidence that it was designed to implement Showing. For instance, the *ab*-Notation does not appear in any extant text or correspondence prior to the Aug. 1913 *Notes on Logic*. Any existence prior to that is mere conjecture, based on dubious autobiographical recollections recorded by Russell (about Wittgenstein meeting Whitehead) several decades later. In any case, when the *ab*-Notation does finally make its appearance in letters and the Oct 1913 *Notes on Logic*, its significance goes far beyond any attempt to implement the doctrine of Showing. Moreover, Russell’s scientific method in philosophy has little if anything to do with Showing. Wittgenstein’s conception of the nature of philosophy *vis-à-vis* science is fundamentally different from Russell’s. Wittgenstein sees them as discontinuous while Russell sees them as continuous.

L: I don’t know what you mean by “continuous with science.” Logic and mathematics are knowable *a priori* for Russell and empirical sciences are only knowable *a posteriori*. The continuity for Russell, as I see it, is that mathematical logic is body of truths and has a subject matter. For Wittgenstein the science of logic and mathematics are not bodies of truths. Now if one cannot free the *ab*-Notation from Showing then there can be little chance of influence even in that early period. On the other hand, Showing can’t undermine influence in 1913 if the ortho-

dox opinion is correct in dating the origins of Showing to 1914 with the Picture Theory. But I see no viable way to free *ab*-Notation from Showing. That is because the very purpose of the *ab*-Notation is to supplant Russell's view that logic is a genuine science (as a body of truths) with the thesis that logical truths are tautologies which don't say anything themselves but are (or reflect) the scaffolding that enables saying (asserting a proposition with truth-conditions). Every genuine proposition, for Wittgenstein, has conditions under which it is true and conditions under which it is false. Logical propositions are not genuine; they are scaffolding. The reason Wittgenstein thinks his *ab*-Notation is not just a variant way to express truth functions is that he thinks it applies to quantification theory and indeed to identity as well. He tries to apply it in this way in letters of 1913 and he even tries in 1913 to indict *Principia's* *12.1.11 as outside of logic on grounds that it transcends what can be captured by *ab*-Notation! This is all in 1913. What in the world could be the source of Wittgenstein's hubris in saying that logic has no subject matter and consists of tautologies (and generalized tautologies) with an identity wff such as " $x = x$ " illicit besides his intuition that Showing must be correct about logic?

C: Well, that may indeed be the outcome of Wittgenstein's studies, but it is difficult for me to think that it was embedded in the *ab*-Notation in 1913. Wittgenstein discovered many things about molecular logical forms through his experimentation with the *ab*-Notation. For instance, he discovered that apparently distinct but equivalent *ab*-functions have a common symbolic form, that distinct *ab*-functions are 'cross-definable' or 'interdefinable', and that all *ab*-functions may be reproduced by repeated applications of a single *ab*-function. Certainly, these ideas are associated with the doctrine of Showing in Wittgenstein's final system, but it is a mistake to identify them or treat them all as reducible to Showing.

L: I don't think Wittgenstein discovered anything here which led him to Showing. Wittgen-

stein invented his *ab*-Notation because he intuited that logic is shown and thereby not a science in the sense of having its own subject matter. His intuition requires that there be a decision procedure for logical truth and he offered his *ab*-Notation as just that. The whole of logic, he proclaims in 1913, follows from just one *ab*-Notation rule. He was entirely mistaken. His position about logic derives solely from his intuition of Showing and of course, Wittgenstein may well have that intuition without using the word "showing." The letters Wittgenstein sent to Russell reveal without question that he thinks the contentlessness of logic is revealed by *ab*-Notation. I find no reasonable source of such intuition except that of Showing.

C: I know that you also say that Wittgenstein appealed to the *ab*-Notation in holding that the role of the logical particles in judgment must be the same as the role they have outside judgment, and thus that the *ab*-Notation must be involved in both. That is a surprising thesis which has long gone unrecognized. But of course it didn't work and Wittgenstein abandoned the *ab*-Notation. He retains a version of the *ab*-Notation in his *Tractatus* on a more limited basis, but says it only works to express and analyse propositions which lack a generality sign (*TLP* 6.1203). He also abandons "*a*" and "*b*" here in favour of "*T*" and "*F*". For quantification theory, he thus appears to have abandoned the *ab*-Notation in favour of his later N-notation. For the more general purposes of expressing and analyzing molecular truth-functions, he prefers and deploys truth-tables. While he abandoned the *ab*-Notation in favour of these other notations, he didn't abandon Showing. So it is difficult to maintain that the *ab*-Notation = Showing.

L: I don't hold that *ab*-Notation = Showing. As I see it, the intuition of Showing is what led Wittgenstein to his *ab*-Notation, the Picture Theory, his N-notation, his emphasis on operations, elimination of a relation of 'identity' and his many other techniques. Indeed, the sole reason for the N-notation is that the *ab*-

Notation (and its variant *tf*-Notation) and the truth-table notation of a propositions all fail to capture quantification theory in such a way that tautologies (and generalized tautologies) have their status as such revealed in the notation itself *without further premise*. Wittgenstein thought his N-notation overcomes these failures. For example, an N-notation for $(x) \sim fx$ is found by expanding to $\sim fx_1 \bullet \dots \bullet \sim fx_n$ and then, in a segue through the Sheffer dagger, putting the result as $N(NNfx_1, \dots, NNfx_n)$. Using the N-operator rules of successively calculating “sameness” we find, *e.g.*, that we are allowed to drop/add inside N-doubles (NNs) and so we get $NNN(fx_1, \dots, fx_n)$. which is the transcription of $\sim (\exists x)fx$. Wittgenstein’s showing demands the decidability of logic (and he is rather explicit about this in 1913) and he thought the N-operator reveals it. In N-notation a tautology wears its status as such on its sleeve. N-notation calculation is intended to be a decision procedure for logic. The N-operator, as with all operators, is given by (recursive) recipes which give the “general term of a series” telling us how to use the operator. But this is all mistaken. Quantification theory is not decidable. (The trouble is that in many cases one must fix the schematic n at some finite number in order to apply the N-operator rules for calculation of “sameness”.)

I know that you have your own interpretation of the N-operator, but we should leave aside details about it because of the many technical complexities. My point is only that in my view the *ab*-Notation (as with the *tf*-Notation and the N-notations) and the Picture Theory etc., are all attempts to implement Showing which is the sole intuition driving the inventions in the first place. The intuition is that logic and mathematics, truth, and the like have no content. They are not to be given (said) by theories with a subject matter.

C: Indeed, my interpretation of N-Notation differs from yours in ways that would be worth briefly describing before we move on, as you suggest. The N-notation appears to me to be

an attempt to implement a distinct if related idea, namely that of the general propositional form. Wittgenstein deploys N to show that all propositions, including analogs of existential and universal quantifications, can be constructed via successive applications of a single truth-function to selections of elementary propositions. A consequence of this is that logically equivalent propositions will have identical N-expressions, and thus that all tautologies will have an identical form when expressed in the N-notation, since they all express the same truth-function. But, as mentioned, this is simply one consequence of the notation, not its essential purpose. Its essential purpose is to figure within a variable (*TLP* 6) which provides the general form of truth-functions and thus of the propositions. Something similar applies to the *tf*-Notation. A feature of the *tf*-Notation is that all tautologies come out as truth-functional truths, but there are many other interesting features it shows. It shows for instance that one proposition may follow from another in virtue of its sharing all of its truth-grounds in common with that proposition, and without any appeal to supplementary axioms or inference rules. According to Wittgenstein, such inference rules amount to nothing more than contentless forms of proof. In any case, do you have an argument for the *ab*-Notation being used to implement Showing in 1913?

L: I believe that the *ab*-Notation is 1913 and its sole stated purpose, as I have noted above, is precisely to reveal that logic has no content, and that it has no subject matter that would be expressed in a theory and that therefore *Principia*’s *12.1.11 are not part of logic at all. A logical proposition supposedly is revealed to be scaffolding (a tautology) when it is given in *ab*-Notation. This is all explicit in 1913 letters. Indeed, I hold that the *ab*-Notation was designed precisely to realize Wittgenstein Parity thesis—*i.e.*, the thesis that a proposition points toward (positively) or away (negatively) from its truth-maker(s). Breaking down the illusion of substantive content that is produced by the negation sign is the purpose of Parity in *ab*-Notation.

For example, the De Morgan's laws use signs \sim , \bullet , in a way that is causing them to seem as if they are genuine scientific truths with content. But in *ab*-Notation (and its treatment of pole switching and writing $b - a \ p \ b - a$ to express negation) this illusion is removed. De Morgan's is scaffolding that shows itself as such in *ab*-Notation. Just untwist the wires to find "sameness." The demand of Parity is rendered by oracular pronunciation and is due to intuition, and no argument is ever given for it.

C: I'm not convinced. One thing the *ab*-Notation is being used to investigate in 1913 is the idea the logical "truths" consist of tautologies and generalized tautologies and perhaps even that they are not genuine propositions. But it doesn't follow that Wittgenstein held in 1913 that tautologies and generalized tautologies *show* and do not say. One can, it seems to me, hold that this came later, and that it involved distinct if related considerations, emerging out of Wittgenstein's critique of the way Russell deployed logical forms within the May-June 1913 version of the mrtj.

L: I can find no reason whatsoever, besides the intuition of Showing, for Wittgenstein to be offering an *ab*-Notation or a Parity thesis or any of it. He was trying desperately to apply it to quantification and identity and proclaiming that logical status is known thereby, in the expression itself, as tautologyhood. It is all mistaken. But why should he be doing this? My answer is that he intuited Showing.

Moreover, as you know, I maintain that *only* the Doctrine of Showing can transform the contingent psychological feature (that a mind does not entertain or believe nonsense) into a matter of pure philosophical logic. Wittgenstein's demand that nonsense in judgment (belief) be ruled out without further premise is just a demand that it be Shown and not said. Indeed, in the *Tractatus* he articulates the very same claim with a requirement that nonsense be ruled out by Showing.

(*TLP* 5.5422): The correct explanation of the form of the proposition 'A

makes the judgement p' , must show that it is impossible for a judgement to be a piece of nonsense. (Russell's theory does not satisfy this requirement.)

Hence, my thesis: *no further premise* = Showing. The reason that issues of nonsense in judgment (belief) are about contingent psychology is that judgment (belief) is itself a contingent matter of the existence of minds and psychology. Logic has nothing to do with contingent concerns. For Russell, Logic has nothing to do with the mrtj. *Principia's* logic is not a theory of propositions (in any sense). It is a theory of the kinds of structure that may be studied *a priori* by studying the way relations order their fields independently of the contingencies of their exemplification.

C: The reason it is important that atomic propositional thought cannot be nonsensical is because it figures essentially within the calculus of propositions which both Russell and Wittgenstein take to be integral to logical deduction. The illusion that this point concerns contingent psychology only arises because, for various reasons, Russell wants to be able to treat propositions as incomplete symbols and to that end embeds them in propositional attitudes. From Wittgenstein's perspective, Russell never should have done that and there are other, more plausible ways, associated with his picture theory of resolving alleged problems and paradoxes associated with propositions.

Moreover, in the introduction to the second edition of *Principia*, Russell considers a proposal to eliminate the axiom of reducibility in favour of the view that "functions of propositions are always truth functions, and that a function can only occur in a proposition through its values" (*Principia* 1925, p. xiv). He attributes this extensionalist proposal to Wittgenstein and proceeds to work out its consequences for the system. How can this not be a case of influence?

Wittgenstein's objection to Russell's mrtj is that it cannot exclude nonsense in a way consistent with basic logical intuitions. Specifically,

that any tautology must follow from any well-formed proposition in the absence of any additional premises. As mentioned, this critique influenced Russell by leaving a significant breach in his epistemology and leading him to abandon his 1913 *Theory of Knowledge* manuscript. Regarding the case of Parity, even if you are correct it seems to me that this is a case of influence! If Russell accepted parity from Wittgenstein (and, as you've argued, it is found in the 1918 *Logical Atomism Lectures* and in the 1921 *Analysis of Mind*), then somehow or other you have to admit that Russell abandoned his mrtj due to Wittgenstein's objection and that he adopted Parity from Wittgenstein.

L: I see no justification for saying that both Russell and Wittgenstein took propositions (in an ontological sense) to be integral to logical deduction. In *Principia* we are dealing with wffs. The ontology of early Russellian propositions (1903-1908) has been abandoned and it is not being emulated in any way shape or form. In *Principia* we find that " $\sim p \vee q$ " is a wff only if both " p " and " q " stand-in for wffs. There are no early Russellian propositions involved here at all. Russell's "no-propositions" theory and the mrtj that is articulated in the introduction of the first edition of *Principia* is *not* part of the formal system of logic of *Principia*. If Wittgenstein thought it was, then he was confused. The mrtj and the introduction are only components of Russell's (failed) semantic interpretation of the formal system, which offers a recursively defined hierarchy of sense of "truth" as applied to wffs of *Principia*. Whitehead never was asked or required to agree with it.

You ask a nice question about influence in speaking of Russell's experimental introduction to *Principia* 1925 edition. (Whitehead explicitly disavowed it in a letter to *Mind* of 1926.) That experiment changed the grammar of *Principia*'s first edition and adopted Wittgenstein's demands of extreme extensionality and ramification, but allows a wff ${}^m f^{(t)}({}^{m+n} g^t)$ where the order index $m + n$ is higher than the order index m . Russell concluded that even with

such dramatic changes, the system still fails to capture Analysis and Cantor's work. Wittgenstein detested this experiment and complained to Ramsey about it, noting that Russell learned nothing from him and that his central idea had been completely ignored—namely, his elimination of identity and his operations approach to arithmetic and logic (which, as I see it, is a consequence of his demand of Showing). Both logic and arithmetic are Shown in calculations of the outcomes of operations. This is just another wonderful case of zero influence.

I see no "breach of Russell's epistemology" (as you put it) that was pointed out by Wittgenstein. I hold that Russell's mrtj had reached an impasse independently of anything Wittgenstein said. The impasse is that Russell's mrtj had (tentatively) introduced abstract particulars (abstract logical facts with no constituents) as among the relata in the multiple relation of 'belief' or 'judgment'. But the agenda of his Scientific Method in Philosophy—an agenda shared by Wittgenstein—was to eliminate the ontology of abstract particulars from every genuine science. Wittgenstein's only role was to encourage Russell to feel intellectually dishonest in persisting in believing that he could avoid abstract particulars in his mrtj account of what belief-fact exists when one has a general (or molecular) belief. For example, it may well be true that Othello believes that either someone else loves Desdemona or Iago is lying. What are the constituents of such a general belief-fact? I hold that this is the "real difficulty" (as Russell called it) that arises with the mrtj. of his 1913 *Theory of Knowledge (TK)*. It arises because Russell's plan was to address this by appealing to acquaintance with abstract general facts (with no constituents) which became known as Russell's "logical forms."

C: We do agree that Russell had a serious problem with the introduction of logical forms. I think that the problem which led Russell to cease work on his *Theory of Knowledge* manuscript was one pointed out by Wittgenstein and not reached independently. The prob-

lem is that for logical forms to be of any use in precluding nonsense judgments, Russell needs to assign judgment constituents to positions within the logical form of the complex which corresponds to the judgment in case it is true. This procedure is incompatible with basic logical intuitions since it implies that additional premises are required to infer a tautology from any well-formed proposition. Wittgenstein ultimately decides by spring 1914 that these basic logical intuitions require that the logical form of a proposition may only be shown but not said. Russell adopted Parity from Wittgenstein—and thus we have influence. Conversely, Wittgenstein critically appropriated his conception of logical form from Russell—and again we have influence.

L: You assume that logical forms (abstract structureless particulars) were introduced in *TK* to avoid nonsense judgment. I disagree. They were introduced to handle our acquaintance with the *adicity* of a relation and the problem of compositionality that occurs with general belief-facts. Structureless logical abstract facts (logical forms) cannot do anything to rule out nonsense judgment, nor should they since what rules out nonsense has nothing to do with logic or the epistemology of logic. The nonsense concern of Wittgenstein never impacted Russell at all. Again, no influence.

Let's focus on Parity. For Wittgenstein, Parity is a feature that can only be realized by Showing. Otherwise, instead of Parity one is stuck with negative facts as truth-makers. If one points negatively to a fact, there is a fact to which one points. If one points positively to a fact, there is a fact to which one points. Russell felt the sting and when he came to entertaining Parity we find it accompanied by his entertaining negative facts. But his is not Wittgenstein's notion of Parity at all. So yet again we don't have a case of influence. When later Russell understood Showing, he rejected it outright as a mysticism about logical form. Wittgenstein's Parity has it that a truth-bearer shares logical form with its would-be truth-maker. How? One

cannot share a logical form with what is not. If there is no fact pointed to, then there can be no shared logical form. Showing is supposed to dissolve the problem.

C: But it seems to me now that your "Showing undermines influence" argument is too easily realized by creatively maintaining that every one of Wittgenstein's views embed Showing; and thus, views that may seem similar found in Russell are, in reality, not the same view at all.

L: Yes, that is a fair point of interpretative concern. But it may well also be correct that *all* of Wittgenstein's views of the period are infested with Showing—including his notion of Solipsism. You maintain that Solipsism is reconstrued by Wittgenstein as the position that "(t)he limits of my language are the limits of my world" (*TLP* 5.6) and that "(l)ogic pervades the world" (*TLP* 5.61) So conceptualized, according to Wittgenstein "what the solipsist means is quite correct" (*TLP* 5.62). I agree that Solipsism has indeed been reconstrued, but you construe it as a scope issue—as if Solipsism for Russell and Wittgenstein both presented a concern that "my thoughts are all encompassing". But this misses the role of Showing in Wittgenstein's notion of Solipsism. Showing entails that the logical scaffolding of my thoughts (and anyone's thoughts for that matter) is the logical scaffolding of the world itself. The limits of my world are the limits of the world which are the limits of your world too because these "limits" are simply the logical forms which scaffold thought. Outside of such "limits," expressions are gibberish (*unsinnig*). Though any statement of the limits themselves is *sinnlos*, they can be shown (illucidated). Russell accepted no such view since he did not hold that the logic is the scaffolding of thought and language and world. For Russell the riddle does exist (the Russell paradox is an example) and he even accepts that a global skeptical thesis is meaningful albeit unsupportable by any argument. In stark contrast, for Wittgenstein the riddle does not exist because thought and world are scaffolded by the same logical form.

C: Wittgenstein's treatment of solipsism does indeed involve Showing, but it also appears in *Tractatus*, completed several years after you claim Showing had already appeared in his philosophy. So the discussion of solipsism in the *Tractatus* may be evidence of Showing, but it is not evidence that Wittgenstein held Showing as early as 1913. For Wittgenstein, moreover, logical scaffolding must show itself because if you try to express it as a condition of sense, this implies that tautologies don't follow from well-formed propositions in the absence of further premises and this, as we have seen, is incompatible with basic logical intuitions. Wittgenstein's treatment of solipsism is a great example of how Wittgenstein critically appropriated Russell's ideas in accordance with his own unique and evolving conceptions of language, logic, and philosophical method. Another idea Wittgenstein's solipsism allows is extensionality, since Wittgenstein's solipsism enables him to exclude subjects from the logical form of belief. On Wittgenstein's view, the subject which understands propositions is the transcendental, metaphysical subject, not the psychological or physical self. Hence, the subject that understands propositions is not in the world, and thus does not occur within the logical form of any cognitive fact, whether it be a fact of believing or understanding.

In any case, how do you propose to handle Occam's Razor? I hold that this idea was also critically appropriated by Wittgenstein from Russell, in the following form of what Wittgenstein calls 'Occam's maxim', namely, that 'if a sign is useless, it is meaningless' (*TLP* 3.328). Is this also infested with Showing for Wittgenstein? Surely you cannot twist this case into your interpretation. How is it infested with Showing?

L: I really still don't know what you mean in saying "... this implies that tautologies don't follow from well-formed propositions in the absence of further premises..." As noted before, it seems to me that tautologies are logically entailed come what may. But I'll leave

that to your book and papers to explain further. I don't know when Wittgenstein began to think about Solipsism (in *his* sense), but since you agree that it is infested with Showing the point is made—namely, that it seems always very straightforward to interpret Wittgenstein's notions as infested with Showing and once infested there is NO influence in either direction. In fact, it is quite easy to view the 1913 *ab*-Notation and the notion that philosophy must be above (or below) all other sciences, etc., and the non-nonsense comments about the mrtj, as all deeply infested with Showing.

Your good interpretative concern, however, is that it is in fact far too easy! Let's try to see how it infests the case of Occam's Razor. As I see it, Russell's appeal to Occam's Razor is simply a rhetorical device to explain his notion of Scientific Method in Philosophy in a non-technical way. His point is not that of an empiricist eschewing undue entities and idle wheels in offering empirical theories. I put Russell's point by saying: *Ontological baroqueism is inversely proportional to logical complexity*. If one has only a narrow conception of the devices of the new mathematical logic, leaving out *12.1.11, and working only with subject-predicate, or even working only with what we now call first order predicate logic that disallows binding predicate variables, then one will be blinded. One will fall into conjecturing all manner of abstract particulars such as (sets, points, geometric figures, crystalline spheres, souls, gods and the like) and specialized kinds of necessity (arithmetic, geometric, biological, physical and metaphysical) governing them. *Principia's* logic where comprehension *12.1.11 is essential to freeing the mind from the prisons imposed by an impoverished logic. This is not to say that empirical studies are unimportant to the agenda of Russell's scientific method in philosophy. The two kinds of science work together. Now when Wittgenstein spoke of Occam's maxim, he was obviously not offering a linguist's "meaning-is-use" theory. He is, in fact, talking about how the logical form of thought and logic and world are the same. Unfortunately, he had no robust

view of comprehension to appeal to since he restricted logic and mathematics to the practice of calculating (showing) sameness of outcomes of equations via recursive rules of operation. As a result, Wittgenstein runs the grave danger of falling prey to ontological baroqueism himself, in spite of the oracular pronouncements against it that arise within his notion of scientific philosophy as showing.

C: I see that you have a technique for spinning things so extensively that a wedge is driven between Russell and Wittgenstein. There can be no influence in either direction so long as Showing, as you put it, infests every philosophical concept that might otherwise have been shared. Let me make one last effort. What of the theory of types itself? Don't they share that? While Wittgenstein thinks types show themselves in logical grammar, and thus that Russell's paradox cannot be formulated since it violates logical grammar, clearly the impetus is to address the paradox, and the appeal to logical prototypes to resolve it. Arent each cases of significant influence?

L: No, indeed, I think that they don't share any theory of types. Wittgenstein does not reject functions in favor of many-one relations (as Russell did). Wittgenstein accepts an ontology of operations, *i.e.*, Fregean functions given by a recipe for application. (This may be just the recursive functions, but the text is not clear). For Wittgenstein there is no need for simple type scaffolding in the object-language because (as Frege knew) function signs must stay in function positions. Thus " $f(fx)$ " is allowed, but not " $f(f)$ " because every the operation sign is itself a prototype (structured variable) that shows the structure of all and only its admissible arguments. The entire notion of "types" is thus shown for Wittgenstein in operation expressions. That is quite different from Russell's scaffolding of simple types whereby individual variables are adorned with simple type indices (and bindable predicate variables are individual variables whose simple type index is not o). Once again Wittgenstein's no-

tion of "types" is infested by Showing. Now the Doctrine of Showing was inspired in Wittgenstein by his reading both Frege and Russell. After all, I do hold that Wittgenstein was Russell's apprentice—sharing the articulation and development of the research program of Scientific Method in Philosophy. But in the case of Russell it derives from his tireless efforts to emulate a theory of simple types without embracing the ontology of entities that come scaffolded into simple types. Wittgenstein seems not at all opposed to embracing a Fregean ontology of a hierarchy of levels of functions (operations)—when they are introduced by recursive definitions and the definitions do the work of showing. Indeed, unlike Russell, he was perfectly willing to embrace that vicious circles are blocked by the ramification embedded in the recursive recipes introducing operations. His orientation to recursively introduced operations and a combinatorial logic (and arithmetic) are precisely what undermines his ability to recover the Frege-Russell science of simple type regimented logic— a science which uses comprehension axiom schemas *12.1.11 to capture the 'ancestral' and 'mathematical induction' logic. Again, no influence.

C: It all seems so very unorthodox. The Picture Theory is clearly 1914. I agree that Wittgenstein's notion of "type theory" is linked to Showing, through the idea that propositions show their logical prototype without saying anything about logical form. But otherwise, I prefer a modest account of the history and have gone some way toward finding it in my work. I don't infest Wittgenstein concepts from 1913 with the notion of Showing. But I do wonder if the history will ever be sorted out-- it now being more than 100 years of interpretation of the Tractatus and the Russell-Wittgenstein story.

James Connelly, *Wittgenstein's Critique of Russells Multiple Relation Theory of Judgment* (Anthem Press, 2021)

Gregory Landini, *Repairing Russells 1913 Theory of Knowledge* (Palgrave-Macmillan, 2022).

Note on a Critical Edition of Whitehead conference

BY LANDON D. C. ELKIND

This past September 16–17 the Whitehead Research Project hosted a conference on Alfred North Whitehead's *Harvard Lectures, 1925–1927*. It ran from 08:00-13:00 Pacific Daylight Time (UTC-7). The conference was free to the public and videos of all of the 30-minute talks, and some discussions, are freely available to watch on the Critical Edition of Whitehead's *YouTube* channel.

Besides the beginning and concluding open discussions, the speakers and talk titles were:

Day 1 of the conference

Silvia Zanelli	Coalescence and Concrescence: Between Eternal Objects and Actual Occasions
Christian Frigerio	Tackling the Concrete: Whitehead's Organic Empiricism and the Role of Practice
Maria Regina Brioschi	Reason in Action: The Place of Dewey in Whitehead's Harvard Lectures
Enrico Monacelli	Transcendence and Concreteness: Jean Wahl's Reception of Whitehead's Philosophy of Experience
Joan D. Caywood	Indexing Whitehead
Paul Bogaard	From a Philosophy of Evolution to a Philosophy of Organism
Philippe Gagnon	Assessing Whitehead's 'Biological Turn'
Daniel Bella & Milan Stürmer	Fill in the Blanks: Social Ethics between Environment and Inheritance

Day 2 of the conference

Matthew David Segall	Standing Firm in the Flux: On Whitehead's Eternal Objects
Landon D. C. Elkind	Using <i>HL2</i> to Connect the Dots between <i>Symbolism</i> and <i>Principia Mathematica</i>
Alessia Giaccone	The Path to Understanding: Relation and Solidarity in Whitehead's Metaphysics
George R. Lucas, Jr.	Reappraising Whitehead's Engagement with Other Modern Philosophers
Daniel Dombrowski	The Dipolar Character of Being in Plato and Whitehead
Michael Heather & Nick Rossiter	Whitehead's 'Big Science' of Process (Note: this paper was not presented due to illness.)
Ronny Desmet	Whitehead's 1925 View of Function and Time

My own talk title is of course alluding to the well-known dot notations in *Principia*. But the paper I gave focuses much more on Whitehead's continuity of thought (I allege) between the publication of *Principia* in 1910–1913 and the publication of *Symbolism* in 1927. But enough self-promotion.

It will not be news to those engaged in Whitehead studies, but readers may be happy to learn that there was a strong Italian contingent of speakers presenting at this conference. It is my hope that Russellians will find common areas of inquiry with them, particularly connecting to Russell's thoughts on physics, science, time, and metaphysics. Some of course have already done so; but that is not the end of the story. (Does history of philosophy have an ending? Is it a happy one?)

The conference celebrated the publication of Whitehead's Harvard lecture notes from over 170 lectures given by Whitehead during 1925–1927. Also included in this volume are some exams

and Whitehead's only known lecture on ethics. Particularly impressive to me was the volume of editorial notes that provided helpful contextualizing information about the lectures, including both their content and their chronology with each other and events in Whitehead's academic life.

The difficult editorial work involved in producing this volume deserves to be recognized and warrants our praise. The editors had to produce a cohesive presentation of Whitehead's lectures based on multiple accounts from the notes of ten students: Louise Robinson Heath (1899–1988), Fritz Jules Roethlisburger (1898–1974), Charles Hartshorne (1897–2000), Edward Schouten Robinson (1904–1968), George Perrigo Conger (1884–1960), Everett John Nelson (1900–1988), Paul Weiss (1901–2002), Lester Snow King (1908–2002), Gardner Jackson (1896–1965), and George Bosworth Burch (1902–1973). Once we add to this burden the usual editorial headaches with undecipherable words, conflicts between notes, correlating them correctly (and arranging them chronologically), and one is led to infer that the editors each did the work of ten persons.

The Whitehead Critical Edition project is currently led by Roland Faber (Claremont), Brian G. Henning (Gonzaga), and Joseph Petek (Claremont). The project's aim is to publish the complete works of Whitehead. Having just finished the Harvard Lectures (two volumes; the first appeared in 2017), the editors aim to start with Whitehead's articles and essays. The excellent series is currently with Edinburgh University Press. They are right to give this great series a proper home.

PCAL Philosophy Professor Receives \$281,104 NEH Grant

BY JESSICA LUNA (POTTER COLLEGE, WESTERN KENTUCKY UNIVERSITY)

Dr. Landon Elkind, Assistant Professor of Philosophy in the Department of Political Science, was awarded a \$281,104 Scholarly Editions and Translations grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH) for his project entitled, "Principia Mathematica: A Critical Edition".

Dr. Elkind's three-year grant, which starts in January 2023, is the largest grant that the Potter College of Arts and Letters (PCAL) received during the 2021-2022 academic year.

Principia Mathematica is a three-volume work on logic and the foundations of mathematics by British philosophers Alfred North Whitehead and Bertrand Russell, published in 1910-1913. The work was profoundly influential on twentieth-century logic, mathematics, and philosophy.

With this grant, Dr. Elkind will create the first ever critical edition of *Principia Mathematica*. His work will involve both digitization and collation. Due to the length of *Principia*, as well as the presence of logical symbols, mathematical demonstrations, and the notations and formatting of the work, typesetting for the digital format will be done manually.

Additionally, the three different editions of *Principia*, along with the six printings of the second edition, the authors' corrections that were never implemented by the publisher, and the publisher's unauthorized edits will be combined in his project.

Dr. Elkind's critical edition of *Principia*, which is already under contract with Cambridge University Press, will include the first authoritative and newly digitized version of the text, along with an editorial apparatus designed to serve as a useful tool for scholars in decades to come.

The National Endowment for the Humanities is an independent federal agency that supports research and learning in history, literature, philosophy, and other areas of the humanities by funding selected, peer-reviewed proposals from around the nation. The agency has been funding projects since 1965.

Transcription Time Answer

BY GREGORY LANDINI

***From the Spring Bulletin:*

In Philip Jourdain's amusing book, *The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell*, there is an engaging passage about the power of the new logic to clarify what, in English, seem to be confusing expressions such as the famous "Deceased wife's sister Act" according to which no one was permitted to marry his deceased wife's sister. Jourdain writes (p. 28):

...the relation of parent to child P and the three classes of males, females, and dead people, we can define wife (female who has the relation formed by taking the relative product of P and \check{P} to a male), "sister", "deceased wife", and "deceased wife's sister", in terms of these ideas and the fundamental notions of logic. ... it must be remembered that, on the other hand, we always reduce the number of symbols in any propositions by increasing the number of definitions in the preliminaries to it. ...from the point of view of logic, we may say that the apparently simple is most often very complicated and, even if it is not so, symbolism will make it seem so, and thus draw attention to what might otherwise easily be overlooked.

As we can see, Jourdain takes " x is a wife of y " to be definable as " x is female and y is male and they both parent someone" i.e. $Fx \bullet My \bullet xP|\check{P}y$. That is certainly odd since one's wife may not be a parent, but worse still is that he forgot that he needs the notion xMy for x marries y . There is also an elephant in the room— the problem of capturing what it is to be deceased which requires notations for time. A Russellian should hold that the class of dead people is empty. Let's put that aside.

***Transcription Contest: Put in symbolic notation:*

No one marries his deceased wife's sister.

Hx : x is a person

Fx : x is female

xPy : x is a parent of y

Dy : y is deceased;

xMy : x marries y .

$(\iota y)(Fy \bullet Dy \bullet y\check{P}|Px)$: the deceased wife of x .

Here is our Answer (following tenselessness idioms). We have to get at the notion that x is a sister of y , and the definite description "the deceased wife's sister". That is not difficult. Recall that

$$x(\check{P}|P)y = df (\exists w)(wPx \bullet wPy).$$

This says that x and y have a common parent. Thus we have:

$$Fx \bullet Fy \bullet x(\check{P}|P)y : x \text{ is a sister of } y.$$

In other words, x and y are both female and have a common parent. (Let's not worry about half-sisters.) Thus:

$$Fz \bullet z\check{P}|P(\iota y)(Fy \bullet Dy \bullet y\check{P}|Px) : z \text{ is a sister of the deceased wife of } x.$$

With these in place we have:

$$(x)(Hx \supset \sim (\exists z)(Fz \bullet xMz \bullet z\check{P}|P(\iota y)(Fy \bullet Dy \bullet yP|\check{P}x))).$$

Does anyone have concerns or suggestions as to how to do this better?

We have entirely neglected the philosophical problems surrounding the expression Dy since “deceased” seems tantamount to “not-currently-existing.” This opens a can of worms! Russellians cannot accept ‘existence’ as genuine predicate. Any analysis will require a foray into the philosophy of time which continues to put advocates up to the neck in conundrums. Russell, of course, was an Eternalist and (at least until he wrote *Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits* 1948) accepted that there are contingent physical events whose overlapping constitutes being positioned in time. Both the beginning (if any) of an event and the ending (if any) of the event live in the overlapping of other events. Events are characterized with a tenseless idiom and situated in times— *e.g.*, the event e that is *Russell’s discovery of a paradox of classes* is such that e^{1901} (*i.e.*, e is at time 1901). So the event d of y being deceased is such that there is some t such that d^t . One needn’t hold that there is an exact moment of death, and thus temporal indices such as t might be a boundary measured in the rationals. If so the dying of y is an infinite non-consecutive a process of events with a boundary. The situation is akin to the rationals $\frac{a}{b}$ such that $\frac{a}{b} < \frac{2}{1}$. However close we get to the boundary $\frac{2}{1}$, one can get ever closer since

$$\frac{a}{b} < \frac{2}{1} \supset (\exists p, q)(\frac{a}{b} < \frac{p}{q} < \frac{2}{1}).$$

To evade a person y having a property of being deceased (non-existing), I imagine that Russell would construe y as a series of events and “deceased” as the ending boundary of that series. I prefer an approach to the formalism of time which leaves entirely open whether there are events and whether persons (and things in general) are series of events. On this approach, tenselessness resides only with the use of quantifiers (and their logical particles), and tense inflections are to occur on all (and only) predicate variables. Thus, for example:

$$\begin{aligned} x\check{P}y &: x \text{ is a parent of } y \text{ (present tense)} \\ x\overleftarrow{P}y &: x \text{ was a parent of } y \text{ (past tense)} \end{aligned}$$

Thus, we can simply use tense inflections as follows:

$$(x)(\check{H}x \supset \sim (\exists z)(\check{F}z \bullet x\check{M}z \bullet z\check{P}|\overleftarrow{P}(\iota y)(\overleftarrow{F}y \bullet \sim \check{F}y \bullet y\overleftarrow{P}|\check{P}x))).$$

Here we evade a property of being deceased. We can simply say that y was and is not female (in chromosome). That is to say, y was alive and is not alive since cells cannot change their chromosomes. Note that the above transcription assumes that the parent of the deceased wife’s sister is alive. To indicate otherwise, put:

$$(x)(\check{H}x \supset \sim (\exists z)(\check{F}z \bullet x\check{M}z \bullet z\check{P}|\overleftarrow{P}(\iota y)(\overleftarrow{F}y \bullet y\overleftarrow{P}|\check{P}x))).$$

In some measure, this parallels the use of tense in natural language and it does not engage in heavy philosophical machinery of events at times. Any thoughts?

Have an idea for contributing to the Bulletin, whether by you or someone else? Write to the editor! See the footer for a link to contact us.